

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00 INRE-00

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O P 171755 Z APR 73 ZDK

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1956

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0167

EXDIS SALT

DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT FOR SECDEF

E. O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 17, 1973

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT
PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, TUESDAY, APRIL 17, 1973.

SEMENOV STATEMENT, APRIL 17, 1973

ONE THE EVE OF THE INFORMAL RECESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
WHICH WE UNDERSTAND WILL BE A WORKING RECESS, I WOULD LIKE
TO EXPRESS SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR
DISCUSSIONS.

THE POSITION OF THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IS
BASED ON THE PREMISE THAT APPROPRIATE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
RESULTS ACHIEVED IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION IN MAY 1972 IN
MOSCOW IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES. THE ABM TREATY
AND THE INTERIM AGREEMENT HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE AND ARE A
MAJOR STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF CURBING AND ULTIMATELY HALTING
THE ARMS RACE. QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE LIMITATION AND
GRADUAL REDUCTION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS ARE IN THE
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INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES AND WILL CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING WORLD PEACE.

THE PROPOSAL OF THE USSR GOVERNMENT OF APRIL 6, 1973, WHICH WAS WORKED OUT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD, INCLUDING THOSE AT THE CURRENT PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WAS TABLED IN PRECISELY THAT SPIRIT, PROCEEDING FROM THE PREMISE THAT IF DR. AMBROSE ZWANE CARRIES OUT HIS INTENTIONS AS REPORTED IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN PRESS TO WRITE OF THE LOSS OF FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCE IN SWAZILAND, HE WILL BE VULNERABLE. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ROUTINE WORKERS' COMPLAINTS, PARTICULARLY IN THE SENSITIVE SUGAR, AND MINING AREAS, MAY DRAW AN OVER-REACTION FROM POLICE AND VIOLENCE COULD ENSUE. THERE IS LITTLE POSSIBILITY THAT LARGELY INCHOATE AND UNORGANIZED OPPOSITION WILL TURN CLANDESTINE OR VIOLENT IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. THE SEEDS FOR THIS KIND OF CHANGE ARE VERY MUCH PRESENT IN SWAZILAND, HOWEVER, AND THE ACTIONS OF KING- IN- COUNCIL WILL BE DETERMINING FACTORS IN THEIR GROWTH AND FINAL FORM.

RECENT EVIDENCES OR SURFACING OF SOUTH AFRICAN INFLUENCE IN THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SWAZILAND ARE DISTURBING. ONE OF THE IMponderables IS THE EXTENT OF THIS INFLUENCE AND WHETHER IT WILL INCREASE. ANOTHER IMponderable IS SOUTH AFRICAN MOTIVES IN THIS REGARD. ONE CAN SEE THREE POSSIBLE MOTIVES FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO STRENGTHEN ITS INFLUENCE THROUGH A REGIME THAT IS UNCHECKED BY PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURES: A) REMOVAL OF IRRITANTS IN THE COMMERCIAL SPHERE SUCH AS COMPETITIVE RADION STATIONS, FERTILIZER PLANTS AND T. V. ASSEMBLY FACTORIES; B) CLOSER LIAISON WITH SECURITY FORCES TO INHIBIT POSSIBLE ADVERSE DEVELOPMENT IN ACTIVITIES (LIBERATION GROUPS) IN SWAZILAND; C) PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECT ON BANTUSTANS OF INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICAN STATE TURNING TO RSA.

4. U. S. POSTURE AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES

- A) STRONG AND OVERT DISPLAY OF DISAPPROVAL: CANCELLATION OF INVITATIONS TO ALL EDX INTERNATIONAL VISITORS; SUSPENSION OF SELF- HELP PROJECT APPLICATIONS; SUSPENSION OF ANY FURTHER PEACE CORPS ARRIVALS; PUTTING GOS ON NOTICE THAT SELECTED AID PROGRAMS ARE UNDER REVIEW PENDING CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION AND RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE; APPROACH AT HIGH LEVEL OF GOS TO EXPRESS DISAPPROVAL; CURTAILMENT OF OFFICIAL AND SOCIAL EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH GOS.
- B) LOW- KEY EXPRESSION OF CONCERN AS MANIFESTED BY PROGRAM ACTIONS: NO FORMAL AGREEMENTS OR NEW PROGRAM COMMITMENTS, INCLUDING EDX, SELF- HELP, AID ACTIVITIES, AND ACCEPTANCE
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NEW PEACE CORPS VOLUNTEER REQUESTS WITHOUT PERIODIC COUNTRY TEAM REVIEW OF CURRENT SITUATION AND CONSEQUENT RECOMMENDATIONS: FIRST SUCH REVIEW TO TAKE PLACE MAY 12, 1973, AND THEREAFTER EVERY 30 DAYS. IMPLEMENTATION OF CONTINUING PROJECTS AND PROGRAMS NOW IN FORCE SHOULD GO FORWARD, BUT WITH ADDITIONAL FORWARD PLANNING ON NEW ACTIVITIES (AID, SELF- HELP, EDX, PEACE CORPS) TO TAKE PLACE ONLY IN- HOUSE AND WITHIN CONTEXT ABOVE- MENTIONED PERIODIC REVIEW AND RECOMMENDATION BY COUNTRY TEAM; EXPRESSION OF CONCERN BY EMBASSY TO GOS OFFICIALS AND OF INTEREST IN EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE.

C) USE FULL RESOURCES OF MISSION IN ACTIVE EFFORT TO SUPPORT MODERNISTS AND ENCOURAGE EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE: CONTINUE FULL RANGE OF MISSION OPERATIONS, INCLUDING IMPLEMENTING PROJECTS ALREADY IN FORCE AND ENTERING INTO DISCUSSION OF FUTURE PROJECTS. ALL EDX GRANTEES TO DEPART ON SCHEDULE AND PENDING INVITATIONS TO GRANTEES TO BE EXTENDED. PLANNING TO PROCEED FOR NEW PROJECTS, WITH EMPHASIS UPON SELECTION OF THOSE WHICH STRENGTHEN POSITION OF MODERNIST PROGRESSIVES IN GOVERNMENT AND ENCOURAGE EARLY RETURN TO CONSTITUTIONAL RULE. ALL MISSION EFFORTS, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL VISITOR NOMINEES, USIS ACTIVITIES, AID GRANTS, AND EMBASSY OFFICIAL AND SOCIAL CONTACTS TO BE DIRECTED IN ACTIVE, IMAGINATIVE AND AGGRESSIVE FASHION TOWARDS THIS GOAL.

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O P 171755 Z APR 73

FM USDEL SALT TWO II

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1957

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT TWO II 0167

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WORKING OUT AGREEMENTS OF THIS KIND ALREADY IN THE NEAREST FUTURE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE, AND WOULD PLAY A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET- AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE DIRECTION CHARTED BY THE MAY 1972 AGREEMENTS. INDIVIDUAL ISSUES COULD BECOME THE SUBJECT OF SUCH PARTIAL SOLUTIONS, AS THIS IS PROVIDED FOR IN THE USSR DOCUMENT OF APRIL 6, 1973.

FURTHER MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS MUST BE WORKED OUT ON THE BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS RECORDED IN THE SOVIET- AMERICAN DOCUMENTS. PROCEEDING FROM THIS PRINCIPLE, IT IS NECESSARY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ITS FULL SCOPE, INCLUDING THE SPECIFICS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES, THE PRESENCE ON BASES IN THIRD COUNTRIES OF OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS CAPABLE OF STRIKING TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE, AS WELL AS OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS.

A DIFFERENT APPROACH WHICH SUBSTITUTES CRITERIA OF A ONE- SIDED NATURE IN PLACE OF AN ACCOUNT FOR THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS SCOPE CANNOT SERVE THE CAUSE OF WORKING SECRET

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OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING. THE USSR DELEGATION ADDRESSED THIS ISSUE AT THE APRIL 10 MEETING AND WE WOULD LIKE ONCE AGAIN TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE U. S. SIDE TO THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THAT KIND OF AN APPROACH.

IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO NOTE THE FOLLOWING. BOTH SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE TREATY ON THE LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS AS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT WHICH PUT AN END TO THE RACE IN ABM SYSTEMS. THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY FULLY MEET THE TASK OF LIMITING ABM SYSTEMS AND SOLVE IT IN PRECISELY THE WAY WHICH IS BEST APPLICABLE TO THE SITUATION IN THIS AREA. IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT ONE CANNOT DRAW AN ANALOGY BETWEEN THE SOLUTION FOR LIMITING ABM SYSTEMS AND A SOLUTION FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. I WILL CITE JUST A FEW REASONS. ABM SYSTEMS WERE LOCATED ONLY ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORIES OF THE SIDES, IN EFFECT THEY WERE IN THE

INITIAL STAGE OF DEPLOYMENT AND COULD BE LIMITED AT MINIMAL LEVELS; THE SIDES CONSIDERED THIS TO BE ONE OF THE MEASURES AIMED AT REDUCING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, AS WELL AS THE RISK OF ACCIDENTAL OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR. NOR ARE THE LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO ABM SYSTEMS, WHICH WERE AGREED BETWEEN THE SIDES, DEPENDENT UPON THE SPECIFICS OF THE GEOGRAPHIC SITUATION OF THE SIDES. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, BOTH IN TERMS OF THEIR COMPOSITION AND THE SCALE OF THEIR DEPLOYMENT, AND ALSO BECAUSE OF SPECIFIC FEATURES INHERENT ONLY TO THEM, PRECLUDE MECHANICAL TRANSFER TO THIS FIELD OF THAT WHICH IS PROVIDED FOR IN THE ABM TREATY.

MR. AMBASSADOR, THE USSR DELEGATION WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT AFTER THE INFORMAL RECESS OUR DISCUSSIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED ON A PLANE, COMMON TO BOTH SIDES, OF A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. WORKING OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND CONCRETE AGREEMENTS ON INDIVIDUAL ISSUES WHICH ARE MENTIONED IN THE USSR PROPOSALS OF APRIL 6, 1973, OR WHICH COULD BE BROUGHT INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAY 1972 AGREEMENTS, WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THIS PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FORTHCOMING DEVELOPMENT IN SOVIET- AMERICAN RELATIONS. EXEMPT-3 AUSLAND
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